La filosofía mexicana y la inquietud por la verdad. La reflexión fenomenológica de Luis Villoro

Abstract

This article examines Luis Villoro’s theory of knowledge through the problem of truth, placing it within the historical, cultural and philosophical context of Mexico. Mario Teodoro Ramírez argues that Villoro’s concern with truth makes it possible to understand the originality of his thought beyond two opposed positions: the dogmatism of a single absolute truth and the scepticism that denies any possible truth. Through a critical discussion of analytic philosophy, the semantic conception of truth, and the criteria of evidence, coherence and consensus, the author maintains that Villoro’s epistemology is more phenomenological than analytic. Truth is not reduced to a formal relation between language and reality, nor to rational justification alone; rather, it refers to an intentional openness to reality. From this standpoint, Ramírez emphasizes Villoro’s pluralism of truth: moral, aesthetic, religious, political, scientific and philosophical experiences cannot be reduced to the model of objective science. The article concludes by pointing toward a new integral epistemology, neither scientistic nor Eurocentric, capable of recognizing the plurality of human and cultural experiences