Criticism of M. Heidegger's «thinking» from epistemological materialism : regarding the distinction between «science» and «weltanschauung» and «philosophy»

Abstract

Starting from the questioning of Heidegger himself, the biographical and historical-cultural situation that makes possible such alternatives at the beginning of the 20th century is reconstructed. After acknowledging the validity of Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl and Dilthey's positions, however, their inconsistencies are detected regarding the ontognoseological priority that he attributes to philosophy and the Weltanschauungen with respect to the sciences, showing the traps, ambiguities and amphibologies in which he premeditatedly incurs to preserve the "halo of mystery" that he grants to the question about the meaning of Being, in which he lingers. . From the «materialist» approach to the determining contexts, what is hidden behind the Heideggerian question, more than the destruction of metaphysics or «Western thinking», is an idealized conservatism of tradition, in which his «criticism» succumbs. Far from seeking an ideological explanation for the link between his philosophy and Nazism, it is argued here that it is this epistemological (not ontological) idealism about the role of philosophy, as well as epistemological descriptionism, that nourishes his conservative elitism and his inability to overcome the ontic-ontological privilege of his singular Dasein as the starting point of all philosophizing.