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El presente ensayo es una revisión de la figura del filósofo inglés Derek Parfit en el primer aniversario de su muerte. Parfit fue una de las principales voces de la filosofía analítica en el terreno de la filosofía moral y la metafísica. De su obra, destacamos la importante contribución de Razones y Personas a la investigación del problema de la identidad personal. Una aportación ineludible para cualquiera que quiera entrar al estudio de dicha cuestión, no solo por la potencia de las tesis que sostiene, sino también, desde el punto de vista de la historia de la filosofía, por la interesante síntesis que de las teorías precedentes hace.
Citas
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OBRA COMPLETA DE PARFIT
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