Abstract
In this paper the author deals with the question of “Leib” (lived body) in Merleau-‐‑Ponty and Richir. The principal question concerns the way the lived body opens the world. After analyzing the “motivity” of the lived body as an “original intentionality” with its temporal, spatial and affective dimensions in the Phenomenology of Perception, the author questions the fundamental determinations of “Leiblichkeit” in the “archaic” sphere of the transcendental subjectivity as well as its specific “individuation” (using the examples of the contemplation of an art-‐‑work and the experience of the other). The question of the lived body appears thus as a good example for the proximity and the differences between Richir and Merleau-‐‑Ponty.

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