Une logique de l’apparaître non phénoménologique ?

Abstract

Is  the  fact  of  appearing  a  phenomenological  question  ?   Can  a

non-­‐‑phenomenological  theory  of  appearing  account  for  it  in  all

of  its  dimensions?  It  has  been  emphasized  that  the  concepts  of

phenomenality   and   of   appearing   were   not   superimposable,

but  can  they  be  separated?  We  offer  to  explore  the  foundations

of   a   non-­‐‑phenomenological   reappropriation   of   appearing.

Why  develop  a  non  phenomenological  concept  of  appearing?

What   is   the   status   of   such   a   concept?   We   focus   on   Alain

Badiou'ʹs   Logics   of   Worlds,   which   is   the   most   comprehensive

attempt  in  this  direction.