Hyperbolic doubt and common sense propositions: repercussions in some strategies outlined in On Certain

Abstract

This paper examines Wittgenstein’s treatment of the use, scope and possibility of doubt in On Certainty. We will review the emergence of a new skepticism arising from hyperbolic doubt, a major turning point in skepticism, particularly in its break with Pyrrhonian predecessors. We will also briefly examine Moore’s attempt to restore common sense as an epistemic legitimator.

Special attention will be paid to how Wittgenstein, addressing the problems raised by these philosophers, proposes a different approach to knowledge. Unlike Moore, Wittgenstein does not seek to answer the skeptical problem but rather examines whether it is a meaningful problem capable of resolution or whether the skeptical question can be dissolved. Although On Certainty addresses various topics, our focus will be on the conditions under which doubting and, consequently, knowing become possible.