On the ineffability and the noetic quality of mystical experiences: analysis based on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

Abstract

According to William James, mystical states of consciousness are characterized, among other features, by their noetic quality, i. e., some knowledge obtained is through them. However, another common feature of mystical experiences is their ineffability. This raises an epistemological question: How can something be known, and yet cannot be expressed? Through the conceptual framework of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, we examine mystical experiences as sources of knowledge. In Wittgenstein’s conception, the mystical is placed at a liminal and negative position: it lies outside the limits of language and of the world, and it refers to that which cannot be said. Despite the weak and problematic epistemic foundation of these experiences from Wittgenstein’s early perspective, we conclude with some reflections on their pragmatic and subjective value for the religious dimension of human life.