Résumé
The problem of determinism and human freedom, which is one of the great debates in philosophy, has been discussed many times by philosophers who have very distinctive perspectives and thereby different results related to the problem. Charles Hartshorne as an American process philosopher has significantly contributed to the debate with his own thoughts and considerations. His thoughts can be divided into two major parts. First is the claim that there is a relative indeterminism within the universe. Second is that (hard) determinist and compatibilist positions have serious theoretical and practical difficulties. This paper is only about second part of his thoughts related to the debate. So, in this paper, firstly, I attempt to depict and examine his objections to the arguments for determinism and compatibilism. And then, secondly, I try to interrogate two fundamental assumptions behind his objections. One is the fallacy of burden of proof and other is a fallacy based on the appeal to common sense in order to prove any factual or metaphysical assertion.
Références
Antony Flew, How to Think Straight: An Introduction to Critical Reasoning, 1998, Prometheus Books, New York. Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics, 1962, Open Court
Publishing, Lasalle-Illinois.
Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature, 1937 (Willett, Clark Company),
Chicago-New York.
Charles Hartshorne, The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy, 1997 (ed. Mohammad
Valady), Chicago: Open Court.
Charles Hartshorne, “Are There Absolutely Specific Universals?”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 68, n. 3, pp. 76-78
(1971).
Charles Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: An Alternative to Hume”, The Philosophical Review, v. 63, n. 4, pp. 479-
(1954).
Charles Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (I)”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 29, n. 16, pp. 421-
(1932).
Charles Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics (II)”, The Journal of Philosophy, v. 29, n. 17, pp. 457-
(1932).
Charles Hartshorne, “Freedom Requires Indeterminism and Universal Causality”, The Journal of Philosophy, v.55, n.19, pp. 793-811 (1958).
Charles Hartshorne, “Indeterministic Freedom as Universal Principle”, Journal of Social Philosophy, v.15, n. 3, pp. 5-11 (1984).
Charles Hartshorne, “Meaning of Freedom (Letters to the Editor)”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: A Magazine of Science and Public Affairs, v. 16, n. 10, p. 374 and 423 (1960).
Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest: A Metaphysics of Ethics”, Ethics, vol. 84, n. 3, pp. 201-216 (1974).
Hakan Gündoğdu, “Corliss Lamont’ta Seçme Özgürlüğü ve Belirlenimcilik Problemi” (The Problem of Determinism and Freedom of Choice in Corliss Lamont), Kaygı:Uludag University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy, n.8, pp. 128-152 (2007).
John Searle, “The Freedom of the Will”, in Philosophy: History and Problems by Samuel Enoch Stumpt, 1994, McGraw-Hill, USA, pp. 766-774.
Peter J. Riggs, Quantum Causality: Conceptual Issues in the Causal Theory of Quantum Mechanics, (Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 23), 2009, Springer Publications, New York.
Robert C. Bishop, “Chaos, Indeterminism and Free Will”, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2003, (ed. Robert
Kane), Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, pp. 111-127.
William James, Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 2006, Cosimı Inc, New York.
Ce travail est disponible sous licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 4.0 International.