The identity between essence and the individual as a key question for the knowledge of nature in Aristotle’s philosophy

Abstract

Essence   seems   to   be   the   substance   but   in   a   way   different   from   that  in  which   the  individual  is  said   to  be  a  substance.   Then,   in   what   sense   can   essence   and   the   individual   be   a   substance?   The   question   is   relevant   because   both   must   be   real.  But  is   the  identity  between  essence  and   the  individual   possible?   And   if   it   is   possible,   will   the   identity   be   total   or   partial?   Faced   with   these   questions   it   is   necessary   to   consider   that   in   Aristotle   the   study   of   the   essence   only   makes   sense   while   trying   to   explain   the   being   of   reality.   Thus   essence   should   be   substance.   From   this   consideration   another   question   comes   in:   Is   reality   composed   of   two   substances?   or,   how   is   it   that   both   of   them   occur   in   the   individual?