Más acá de la ontología fundamental: Heidegger y la cuestión del método

Abstract

The aim of the present study is to show the methodological insufficiency into which Heidegger falls from the beginning of his redefinition of the question of being in the initial paragraphs of Sein und Zeit. This methodical deviation finds its deepest root in the fact of setting the attempt of “elucidation of the sense of being in general” in the context of a mediate kind of search, in which, furthermore, the object pointed at by the approaching of the investigation is conceived from an “objectivist” point of view. So, the concept of immediacy (decisive on this matter) is dodged and, because of this, the ontological research originally undertaken by Heidegger changes the course of its direction at the beginning of the thirties, entering in a phase defined again by the presence of multiple “methodological” apories. In opposition to this, we propose to reverse the way in which Heidegger defines the method of consideration of being, in order to get a new basis for ontology as a philosophical discipline. The exposition of the reasons why such inversion is pertinent passes by an examination of the way in which the problem of method is broached by Heidegger´s thought, so much in the context of his initial program, as in the course of his posterior theoretical itinerary.