Cómo convertirse en otra persona sin dejar de ser uno mismo

Abstract

This article develops a metaphysical theory of the person by critically revising classical debates in analytic philosophy on personal identity. Guillermo Hurtado argues that those discussions focused too narrowly on finding necessary and sufficient conditions for determining when a person remains the same, without first answering the more fundamental question of what a person is. Against this approach, the author shifts attention toward personal change and asks how it is possible to become another person without ceasing to be the same human being. He first introduces a theatrical metaphor: the person as a face or mask shaped through interaction with others. He then formulates his central metaphysical thesis: a person is neither a substance separate from the human being nor a merely nominal construction, but a contingent mode of the existence of a human being. From this perspective, personal identity requires bodily and psychological continuity, yet neither of these provides a definitive criterion on its own. The article concludes that the question of who we are remains open, and that the ethical and legal problems arising from personal identity must acknowledge this complexity rather than reduce it to an exact formula.