Refugee Encampments in Calais: Between Jungle and City
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Thousands of refugees\(^1\) are currently settling in the forests around the city of Calais, a major ferry port and terminal of the Eurotunnel on the French-British border. Throughout its existence, the Calais migrant camp, also known as ‘the (New) Jungle,’ has attained vast media attention especially in Great Britain where it appears as the major battleground of the so-called European migrant crisis\(^2\). British mainstream media usually portray the camp as “encroaching on and threatening white suburbia,” and associate it with “degradation, barbarism and illegality.”\(^3\) In particular, the spatial metaphor of the jungle serves journalists to frame the camp as a criminal, lawless and chaotic Other in opposition to civilized society.\(^4\) Scholars have criticized that such construction “becomes a distance-framing device that depersonalizes, dehumanizes and delegitimizes [the migrants’] suffering.”\(^5\)

Interestingly, one can detect at least one second axis of media representation: that of framing the camp as a city. These articles are illustrated by photographs that show entertainment localities. This representation seems paradoxical: how can the Jungle resemble the civilized and orderly structures of a city? Taking account of this contradiction, this study discusses to what extent the informal encampment can indeed be considered a city. Following a short introduction to the Jungle of Calais, the media representation of the Calais refugee camp is analyzed in more detail by looking at two newspaper articles published by the British tabloid \textit{Daily Mail Online} on October 13, 2015, and on December 6, 2015. Due to a lack of academic literature on

\(^1\) Being aware of the difference between the legal status of ‘refugee’ and the sociological factum of being a ‘migrant,’ the two terms are used interchangeably throughout this study.

\(^2\) The term ‘migrant protection crisis’ might be more appropriate.


the urban features of the Calais refugee camp itself, the paper then reviews existing literature on the urban features of refugee camps worldwide. Based on these findings, it finally discusses to what extent the Calais refugee camp can be considered as a city.

Introduction to the Jungle of Calais

Calais is one of the major sites of illegal refugee encampments in north-western Europe for already twenty years. Its existence is due to the UK’s particularly strict security controls taking place on the French side of the border. As the migrants’ attempts to illegally cross the English Channel, while hidden in lorries, ferries, and cars, are often in vain, they temporarily settle in and around Calais. In the late 1990s, a Red Cross-run reception center was created to concentrate the arriving refugees. Following its closure in 2002, informal encampments out of tents and self-made shacks have been emerging between the dunes all along the French coast. The shanty-like settlements of small groups of refugees were evicted repeatedly and violently by the French police forces, and re-erected by the refugees, yet in decreasing quality and further away from Calais. What is currently known as ‘the Calais Jungle’ exists since 2009, when a group of Pashtun Afghan refugees erected a bigger and more developed encampment in a small forest in the outskirts of Calais. The so-called ‘Pashto Jungle,’ derives its name from the Pashto word dzanghal (forest). The camp had grown up to around 700 migrants living in 60 quite solid shacks when it was demolished by the French authorities in September 2009. The refugees then went back to the prior precarious living conditions within less visible encampments, sleeping beneath plastic covers that were hidden during daytime.

Due to the increasing dimensions of armed conflicts in the Near and Middle East and Africa, the numbers of refugees arriving in Calais have been rising and encampments have been growing and stabilizing again since 2014. Currently, the

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main Jungle in the east of the city center has about 6,000 inhabitants. The camp facilities have been professionalizing as the non-profit organization *La Vie Active* started a permanent reception center which provides hot meals, sockets for mobile phones, toilets, showers, potable water, washing machines, administrative support in questions regarding asylum claims etc., and accommodation for 400 women and children. Moreover, the city of Calais, together with the French government, has erected 169 new containers to accommodate 1,500 people in 2015. Yet, the regular demolition of the encampment continues as a part of the camp has been evicted in February and March 2016.

### Representation of the Calais Refugee Camp in the Daily Mail

*“Now the Calais ‘Jungle’ Camp Has Its Own Nightclub”* (October 13, 2015)

Tomlinson’s article suggests that the camp is almost a city in spite of the refugees’ miserable living conditions. It refers to the camp as a “semi-functional town” and enumerates its facilities such as “mosques, shops that sell food and cigarettes, restaurants and even a bicycle repair shop” as well as its “nightclub to party the night away.” The idea of the camp as an almost idyllic small town is illustrated by six photographs of a tent used as nightclub and partying people (Fig. 1), as well as one picture of a camp shop (Fig. 2).

![Fig. 1 Nightclub](image1.jpg)  
![Fig. 2 Shop](image2.jpg)

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“How Calais’ ‘Jungle’ Migrant Camp Has Now Become a Mini City” (December 6, 2015)

White’s article asserts that within the barely two months’ time, Calais has indeed become a small town with all typical facilities of urban areas. The journalist defends his hypothesis by emphasizing the permanent character of the settlement as well as its numerous facilities and services. Provided with a labelled aerial photograph of the camp which serves as a map (Fig. 3), the article enumerates the camp’s public facilities such as mosques and churches which include “a wooden Eritrean and Ethiopian Orthodox Church” (Fig. 4), an art gallery (Fig. 5), “more than a dozen shops” arranged along the market street which is the “beating heart” of the camp (exemplarily Fig. 6), areas where to play table football and dominoes (Fig. 7), a mobile charging station (Fig. 8), and a book shop that functions as a school where English and French classes are given (Fig. 9). Furthermore, a playground for children with wooden climbing frames, a sculpture garden, and an “Eritrean nightclub which serves super-strength beer” are mentioned. Services include “restaurants, libraries, and even makeshift hotels,” a weekly “beauty day” “with massages and other treatments available” and an “information centre offering advice on how to get
asylum in Britain.” In addition to that, the article speaks of plans to provide free Wi-Fi within the camp. All in all, White frames the camp as a “self-contained mini-city” in which “almost every need is catered for as charities supply hot meals and build wooden shacks, and human rights lawyers offer advice on asylum.”
The Refugee Camp – a City?

Both Daily Mail articles, especially the second text, frame the informal encampment in Calais as an evolving city with all necessary urban facilities, leisure and even wellness services. In order to answer the research question if refugee camps in general and the Jungle in particular can indeed be considered as cities, the refugee camp as such and the city is defined. Subsequently, the urban features of refugee camps worldwide are discussed.

Defining the Refugee Camp

In political and public discourse, the refugee camp is perceived as an emergency measure that constitutes an exceptional response to a perceived crisis. As camps most often constitute separated areas deemed to exist for a limited however not determinate amount of time, they are subject to both spatial and temporary boundaries. Agier distinguishes four types of refugee camps, namely big official refugee camps registered by international agencies such as UNHCR and national administrations, camps for internally displaced persons, small auto-organized camps sometimes called ‘ghettos’ or ‘jungles’ in proximity to national borders, and, arguably, immigration detention centers where migrants are concentrated to be deported.

With regards to the living conditions in the camp, Agamben has introduced the well-discussed notion of ‘bare life’ (nuda vida) to which the camp’s inhabitants are reduced. He argues the refugees are considered as mere human bodies without rights as humanitarian and state actors deprive them of political agency, exclusively

12 The notion of ‘bare life’ (in other translations more literally translated as ‘naked life’) was introduced in Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), and further developed in Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends. Notes on Politics, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
caring for the security and biological needs of the refugees. The camp thus becomes an exceptional legal grey zone where a permanent state of emergency which neglects citizens’ rights is tolerated. Agamben’s theory is being further developed by Agier who defines the camp along the three lines of extraterritoriality, exception and exclusion. The camp then appears as a separated area in which a permanent state of exception legitimizes political, social, and legal exclusion of non-citizens vis-à-vis citizens.\(^\text{13}\)

Turner however disagrees with the reduction of refugees to ‘bare life’ in camps. Indeed, he perceives refugee camps as more ambiguous and contradictory spaces where, however bad the living conditions may be, new identities can be created.\(^\text{14}\) Beyond refugees’ mere biological existence in the camp, Turner identifies “a different reality where sociality is (re-)created, social hierarchies are produced and politics continues to have significance.”\(^\text{15}\) The cultural, linguistic, and social diversity within refugee camps can transform the camp, as Agier puts it, into “cosmopolitan crossroads [carrefours cosmopolites]”\(^\text{16}\) where new forms of social organization are created. Agamben’s notion of the camp is too short-viewed, as Ramadan summarizes:

The refugee camp is more than just a humanitarian space of physical relief and welfare, more than a space of exception and intensified biopolitical control. […] It is also a space of refuge from the bewildering disorientation, insecurity and marginality of exile. It is an assemblage of buildings, homes, people, institutions, social relations and practices that have grown up from a gathering of destitute refugees sheltering in tents.\(^\text{17}\)

\textit{Defining the City}

Having briefly defined the refugee camp, a working definition of the city is needed. Schumann determines that

[the] city is a concentration of population on a topographically coherent territory with a consistent and central administration. It is the central locality with regard to its surroundings and maintains long-distance trade relations. Division of work determines the differentiated


\(^{15}\) Ibid.


social fabric of the city. The permanent development of the city discernibly differentiates according to its purposes.\textsuperscript{18}

Throughout history, definitions of the city have been closely connected to the normative and highly contested concept of urbanity which refers to the specific way of life and sociality within cities.\textsuperscript{19} Since Greek and Roman Antiquity, the cultural notion of urbanity evokes an especially orderly and civilized as well as civilizing form of living together in cities which has usually been regarded as superior to life in the ‘provincial’ countryside. Confronted with industrialization and urbanization processes in the Western World, sociologists have defined a city population’s social heterogeneity and cultural diversity as both main characteristic of and condition for true urbanity.\textsuperscript{20} Within the heterogeneous urban society, the individual’s dignity plays a crucial role, which entails that city life is furthermore distinguished by the manifest separation of private and public spheres through architecture.\textsuperscript{21} Normative aspects also crystallize in conceptions of urbanity that stress the free self-determination of the individual in a democratic community as a constituting feature of true urbanity.\textsuperscript{22} Based on these reflections, the above definition of the city can be complemented by pointing out that a human settlement acquires urban features especially when its population is culturally diverse and socially heterogeneous, its surface comprises separated public and private areas, and it provides the individual city dweller with opportunities to participate in political decision-making processes.

\textsuperscript{18} This working definition was given by Ulrich Maximilian Schumann in the MA Euroculture course “Cultural History: The European City” held at Strasbourg University from February to April 2016.


\textsuperscript{22} Salin, “Urbanität,” 13f.
Urban and Non-Urban Features of the Refugee Camp

Guérot and Menasse allege that “building towns seems to be human nature.”23 The Jungle and other camps worldwide could be visible manifestations of this desire to urban development. To what extent can the camp be considered as urban according to the above definition? First of all, it constitutes a concentration of population within a topographically coherent territory that is more or less closed towards its surroundings, especially if a camp is erected following the guidelines published in the UNHCR emergency handbook.24 With regard to the necessity of a consistent and central administration, it is crucial to distinguish between official camps and informal settlements. Whereas in context of the former, administration is assured by the UNHCR, another NGO or a national agency, the latter rely on forms of self-organization by the refugees. Indeed, the erection of informal settlements as such is a manifestation of self-organized administration, a form of “occupation of space [occupation de l’espace]”25 by people and groups without own territory. In Algerian camps for refugees from Western Sahara, for instance, the Sahrawi people have efficiently self-organized, constructed houses out of their own brick production and built up a school education and health care system.26 Even within miserable illegal settlements hidden in the Moroccan forests near the Spanish exclave Ceuta, political and social structures have been registered as the refugees auto-organize in national communities who then elect a ‘chairman’ to represent the community before and communicate with employees of NGOs or human traffickers.27 On the other hand, within official camp contexts, refugees have developed political and administrative structures in opposition to the official camp administration. The case study of the Agamé camp for Togolese refugees in Benin revealed evolving traditional forms of political representation such as the election of a president and nomination of

representatives.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed, it often is conflict between refugees and humanitarian organizations about the further development and organization of the camp that triggers political self-organization amongst the refugees.\textsuperscript{29}

Particularly interesting is at this point the separation of private and public areas within refugee camps. As the separation of public spaces in opposition to private property is usually dependent on the definition by a state or at least some form of state-like administration that furthermore accords rights to its citizens, this aspect of urbanity does not seem to apply to refugee camps since refugees are not citizens of their host state.\textsuperscript{30} However, again in the case of the Sahrawi people, it can be observed that the refugees who constitute a state-less minority within Morocco have created national institutions on Algerian soil “anticipating the creation of a state that belongs to them within the borders of their homeland [anticipant la création d’un État qui leur soit ‘propre’ dans les frontières du pays natal].”\textsuperscript{31} With the creation of a state-like entity, the separation of the camp space into public buildings (schools, health care centers, political institutions, etc.) and private housing areas is obvious.

As to a city being the central locality with regard to its surroundings, some refugee camps indeed become central and important localities within their host countries. For instance, in underpopulated and societally fragmented Chad, camps constructed for Sudanese refugees considerably contribute to the country’s engagement within an international network, due to the presence of humanitarian and state organizations.\textsuperscript{32} A camp’s position as central locality is usually reinforced if it constitutes an important economic and trade entity. Some long-lived refugee camps, e.g. Hagadera in Dadaab, Kenya, maintain trade relationships and networks throughout the whole host country and beyond its borders.\textsuperscript{33} Refugee camp economies usually are “rich and varied” with at least one “trading center where small businesses are concentrated in addition to organized markets for trading in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Herz, “Tindouf (Algérie). Les Camps Sahraouis, Préfiguration de l’État,” 112.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Herz, “Refugee Camps – or – Ideal Cities in Dust and Dirt,” 281.
\item \textsuperscript{33} Manuel Herz, “Flüchtlinge als Städtebauer in Eastleigh, Nairobi,” Stadtbauwelt 176, 48 (2007): 52.
\end{itemize}
locally-produced and imported goods.” 34 In the diversity of the economic sector, a certain division of work can thus be detected.

As mentioned above, refugee camps are an emergency measure and therefore subject to temporary boundaries, indicating that a permanent and sustainable development is impossible. In particular, informal camps typically exist for a short time only. 35 Nevertheless, numerous cases worldwide are proof of the opposite. In practice, especially official refugee camps under the supervision of the UNHCR that are usually found in poor countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, 36 tend to exist far longer than initially planned. Some camps in Pakistan, Algeria, Zambia, and Sudan have been existing for thirty years already, others in the Middle East even for sixty years. 37 The duration of refugee settlements depends rather on the decisions of international and national actors than on the refugees’ intentions.

In his analysis of refugee camp economies, Werker found that “refugee settlements may be more like cities than camps,” 38 and it is indeed apparent that the camp can be considered as at least partly urban with regard to the above definition of the city. Typically, it takes only about six months for camps to develop urban structures; 39 and the longer refugee camps keep existing, the more signs of urban development are visible. 40 In the process, camps become spaces in which national citizenship is contested and a “new urban citizenship” 41 is produced. They are then able to become ‘hyper urban’ (hyperurbains) in the sense that they are used as “means

38 Werker, “Refugee Camp Economies,” 462.
of emancipation, autonomy, social exchange and mobility [outil d’émancipation, d’autonomie, d’échange social et de mobilité].”

Yet, the camp’s urbanity is contested. Agier acknowledges the camp’s resemblance to a city by introducing the notion of ‘city-camp’ (camps-ville), but emphasizes that the camp can never become truly urban. He argues that, due to the camp’s uncertain duration and constraints to the inhabitants’ sovereignty, it reveals an “incomplete, unfinished, form of urbanity. Even when stabilized, the camp remains a stunted city-to-be-made, by definition naked. [It does] not manage to turn into a genuine space of urban sociability, an urbs, and from there to realize itself as a political space, a polis.” Forever excluded from regional cartography, camps remain hors-lieux, i.e. spaces “outside of the places and outside of the time of a common, ordinary, predictable world.” These reflections are confirmed by the Sahrawi camps where the camps’ architecture reveals a mere temporary character: even though the camps have been erected as early as 1975 and the solution of the conflict over the territory of the Western Sahara is not in sight, the camp infrastructure is still provisional – not least in order to express the wish and determination to return to the homeland one day.

According to Agier, camps could turn into veritable cities only if the camp management recognized the camp as an enduring settlement rather than an emergency measure, allowed economic activity without restrictions, and viewed the refugees as humans with agency rather than passive victims. It seems however crucial to add that it is not exclusively the international and national players’ actions that provide camps with a merely temporary and therefore non-urban character, but also the refugees’ attitude towards the encampment as a residence for a transitional period only.

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44 Ibid., 337.
45 Ibid., 323.
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Having shown that many camps certainly resemble cities but cannot be considered fully-fledged urban entities in the sense of the applied working definition, the above analysis casts doubt on the Daily Mail authors’ assumption that the Jungle has become a city. The following paragraphs discuss the camp’s urban as well as non-urban features in more detail.

Urban Features

The Calais refugee camp resembles a city to a certain extent because it constitutes a considerable concentration of population who engages in various economic activities on an at least temporarily coherent territory. The existence of shops and restaurants indicates a certain degree of division of work amongst the inhabitants as well as trading relations with the surroundings. According to a media report, the Afghan community controls trade with food, tobacco and products of everyday use in the camp, while people from a near-by supermarket come on a regular basis to sell bread to the camp inhabitants.48 The article furthermore assumes that human traffickers have built up long-distance networks between France, the UK, and the refugees’ home countries.

From the sociological viewpoint, the camp can be regarded as urban in that it regroups a variety of nationalities, cultures, and religions, i.e. it reveals a high degree of social heterogeneity and cultural diversity. Due to the repeated evictions of the settlements and the restriction of the tolerated Jungle to a smaller area, the former segregated groups have been forced to move closer together, constituting now a heterogeneous camp society. The division of space and work by nationality indicates a differentiated social fabric within the camp.

Non-Urban Features

More numerous, however, are the non-urban features of the camp. It is apparent that the encampment lacks any form of consistent administration. Since it is an illegal settlement, neither the French government nor international humanitarian organizations are responsible for its maintenance. In the end it comes down to NGOs to administer the distribution of food and health care, or to organize protest actions against the evictions.  

Although the very construction of the camp and the differentiation of space in several districts such as market street and housing area are of course signs of self-organization by the refugees, there are few signs of political and administrative initiatives. For instance, actions protesting against the evictions are restricted to small groups, e.g. an organized hunger strike by twelve Iranian migrants in March 2016. Only in the past, self-organized migrant activism has been recorded.

Due to the lack of administrative structures, the separation between private and public space in the Jungle can only be superficial. Whereas public areas such as the market street with shops and restaurants, as well as religious buildings are clearly earmarked, there is no central authority able to ensure the privacy of housing areas. Indeed, privacy is barely achievable in and around the shallow tents and shacks erected between the dunes. The intensification of so-called security measures such as fences, cameras, and infrared light detection devices, as well as the presence of policemen seems likely to further reduce the personal privacy of the camp population, the demolition of the individual tent being the most extreme form of intervention within the private sphere.

The repeated evictions by the French authorities not only deny the refugees private property, but also impede any permanent development of the camp. The

Jungle thus remains “forever temporary.” 52 The consequences of impeding development are manifold. It first and foremost hinders the establishment of the camp on a coherent territory, as well as stable economic activities and long-distance trade relationships. It is therefore unlikely that the Jungle becomes a central locality within the area where an orderly and civilized way of life develops.

Concluding Remarks

This study sought to shed light on how the Calais refugee camp is framed as a city in the British tabloid Daily Mail and to what extent this representation reflects the camp’s actual urban features. Analysis and discussion have shown that, although the Jungle resembles a city in its diverse economic activities and heterogeneous population, it can however not be regarded as urban. Facilities such as a nightclub, restaurants, and a bookshop, identified as typical manifestations of urbanity by the Daily Mail journalists, do not automatically transform the camp into a city. In order to be considered a city, the camp must meet criteria such as separated public and private areas, planned permanent development, some form of administration, and possibilities of democratic participation by the inhabitants. Therefore, the Jungle is an hors-lieu rather than a functional city. Framing the camp as a city does not rehumanize the refugees as demanded by Ibrahim and Howard,53 but risks to relativize the inhumane, slum-like living conditions in the Jungle which constitutes a humanitarian catastrophe on European soil.

The study moreover reveals that the degree of urbanity that can evolve within a camp is highly dependent on its legal status and contextual conditions. Official refugee camps in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa are more likely to develop urban features since they tend to exist for a longer time and economic activity is often promoted by humanitarian actors. The illegal settlements in Calais, in turn, cannot become a city because they are constantly under threat to be partly or wholly demolished. In wealthy Europe, state authorities are reluctant to tolerate the informal encampments as they are both symbol for and manifestation of failed immigration

policies and loss of control over the territory. On the other hand, the Jungle does not urbanize since the refugees themselves, keen to enter the UK, do not perceive the camp as a permanent settlement. In the end, the Jungle’s inability to become a city comes down to the tension between temporariness and permanence.

In the camp context, no matter if in wealthy European countries or poorer parts of the world, migrants are denied the right to have rights for the simple fact that they are not citizens of the host state. This observation is especially alarming if one takes account of Agier’s hypothesis that “the camps are about to become one of the major components of ‘world society’ [les camps sont en train de devenir l’une des composantes majeures de la ‘société mondiale’].”54 The present study has therefore sought to contribute to, again following Agier, “make the camps famous [rendre les camps célèbres],”55 in order to denounce the treatment of migrants who have not been legally recognized as political refugees by European states. It must be stressed that “the right to the city is a human right [le droit à la ville est un droit humain],”56 as pointed out by Hanappe. The migrants living in the Jungle need to be accorded the right to the city as well. Herewith, the potential for self-organization that has already been observed in the Jungle could be fruitfully exploited as a means to solve the migrant protection crisis in Europe. A promising yet utopian solution has been broad up by Guérot and Menasse; they suggest to acknowledge the migrants’ agency and let them construct their own cities on European soil – just as European settlers did when immigrating to the United States.57 Who would not agree that ‘New Damascus,’ sounds more promising than ‘the Jungle’?

55 Ibid., 17.

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