Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich in Richir´s intersubjectivity
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To them, I said, the truth
would be literally nothing but
the shadows of the images.
Plato, Republic, VII, 514a-521b

The relationship between self and Phantasie is crucial to understanding the composition of Richir´s intersubjectivity, thus, the role of both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich as active and integrant parts of such compound are fundamental in grasping such shaping of self, and thereby, of the other, but also, the liaison among them is intriguing as both come from Phantasie, yet they are different from each other.

Nevertheless, self on Richir´s thought is never isolated, but it is an integrant part of a community, an intricately interwoven tissue shaped by multiple selves, all of them independent from one to another and unique, by themselves. Notwithstanding, this community is also conformed by other elements that propitiate the creation and support of such combination. This idea confers an interesting and relevant approach on Richir´s intersubjectivity, because it eliminates the uncertainty of Descartes´ cogito, which brings out the issue of discerning the relationship between self and other, both in apparent isolation, as there will never be any kind of connection, so to say, we all think, but it does not necessarily means we share the same thoughts, creating an unavoidable distance among each others. Then, the kinship, or otherwise, the conflict between self and other represents an issue, a problem to grasp and to understand, as Richir points out is the conjunction in distance. Husserl´s idea of self is fundamental to understanding Richir´s take on, there must be some kind of detachment to realize and understand the other, the self must become an observer in order to understand where it stands itself and others´ position as well, however, this
situation is not the best case scenario, as we cannot de-attach us from ourselves, we stand in a position where we are biased and conditioned for both our selves and our bodies.

Thus, Richir emphasizes Husserl’s ideas of Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, both notions are essential to comprehend Richir’s intersubjectivity. However, Richir makes a clear distinction: “This is nothing like the idea of other as a “center of orientation”, the Nullpunkt is not a point or center locatable in the real body and in the real space, but as it was an element of space or a spatialization cell from which there is orientation […] Phantasieleib is here both a spatializing and a spatial element in the Phantasie.” (Richir, Phénoménologie en esquisses: nouvelles fondations1, 2000, pp. 137, my translation). Richir points out the difficulty of accepting a neutral, impartial and unbiased position, it seems an impossible case scenario, as this is not the case nor it will never be. Nevertheless, as Richir states, there is an element in the Phantasie which serves with this role, the Phantasieleib, relegating the self from such task, indicating there is more than the self-other connection. In that matter, there are more elements in play to be considered and should be taken into account.

Accordingly, as it was previously pointed out, it must be reiterated that Phantasieleib plays an important and active part in shaping the self from Phantasie, thus, we must shift our static vision, and it should not be considered it as a passive one, leib in German means flesh, there must be an element form Phantasie which propitiates the embodiment of self. Then, it must be taken into consideration that Ich means I in German, consequently, there is also a part of the Phantasie which transforms itself into body and another into self, to propitiate the combination and conformation of us as we know ourselves. Therefore, Phantasie-Ich is also required in this process, but it is not similar to Phantasieleib. According to Richir’s explanation “the epoché bears at once, in our terms, the real Self who imagine the apparition of phantasia when transposed into image, and the imagination itself, which as phantasia fugitively fixed a moment (jetz), it involves the apparition of phantasia, which, to us it implies in its turn a Self of phantasia (Phantasie-Ich) and a

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1 For future references, the acronym PE will be used to refer to this book and as it is written in French, all quotes will be my translation, so it will not be further included this specification either, only the page number will be added.
body of the phantasia (phantasieleib)” (PE, pp. 131). This dismemberment from Phantasie, a modification which does not take the whole essence of the latter, has a purpose, an aim to fulfill, but in addition to both elements, the one focused on leib and the other on ich, there must be some kind of differentiation so each one of us can be unique and distinctive from each other.

Consequently, both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich have a distinguished activity in the apparition and involvement of phantasia in ourselves and they are both required in Richir’s task of providing a new foundation to Phenomenology. Whereas, they seem to lead to a dual perception of Phantasie, body and soul, this would become a simplification of what Husserl, and Richir after him, understood, as according to the former, there is no self without a body, in his own words “I do not have the possibility of distancing myself from my body, nor it from me […] The same body that serves me as a means of all perception stands in my way in the perception of itself and is a remarkably incompletely constituted thing” (Husserl, 1952, pp. 159, my translation). Hence, there is an indissolubility among self and body, we cannot grasp one without the other, there is no transmigration of selves to other bodies, or vice versa, but it also points out the intricate entailment among elements, which makes its analysis difficult, but not less interesting. Husserl also indicates the need of having a body to be able to perceive, even though it becomes a predicament, because it limits us in how we discern, supporting a fragmentary awareness of the setting we are living in, in other words, we are limited by our physical appearance, yet it is a requirement to obtain knowledge and to process it, despite is not perfect it is the best case scenario and a needed one too.

Then, there must be a factor or multiple ones that differentiates each self, that creates and shapes each one of us differently because we all come from Phantasie. Although, if both elements in play, so to say, Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are taken from the same origin, the Phantasie itself, then, what makes self and other differ from each other? It must questioned then, the process as the results are different one to another. In fact, the possibility of creating different outcomes when the exact same makers come into action is minimum, in addition to the fact that the probability of having different results is rare, however, actually, the results vary each
one of us is different and unique and we can clearly distinguish not only myself from other, but we can recognize differences among the others in front of me.

We must take on the process, as it seems to be the only differentiating factor which could propitiate a change in each one of us, as the elements in place are the same. Regarding this topic, Richir states that:

“Let us emphasize the "given" which, as we have seen, is a fingieren in a simulacrum of Phantasie-Ich. We have seen that the present and past of phantasia have never properly existed as such, but are only "imagined", afterwards, to have taken place, or to have taken place if at these moments I had not lived in pure phantasia. It is all the difficulty of the quasi-epoch that arises here […] As in the case of the memory, I take a posture in the now which corresponds to the Stiftung of pure possible with respect to what is the non-present or the non-present of phantasy, but if, in addition, in this posture, I imagine ("phantasm") of being present or passing by, I let play what Husserl revealed as the «variability» of phantasia and imagination, I transpose it also in the regime of phantasy and imagination, and the variability which, in the case of pure imagination, gives a pure possibility to the «rational» construction, gives here, by the same transposed process, the possibility that is distinct from the first. [...] Through this, I can aim at it at present, as being purely and simply a possibility, but affected by as-if for or, it is being pure and simple, it is in simulacrum, as a kind of what we call Ontic simulacra. The new step taken by Husserl here consists in being aware of the possibility since phantasia (and not merely from logico-eidetics), to consider it, even in the case where, connected to the being (what is), it is possible that is, as a coherent construction in phantasy and imagination, the intentional or sedimented intention, instituted, serving as a guide to the construction. As such, the possibility which is, in its «phantasmic» mode of being-as-if, is well traversed or underestimated by a certain belief that is both a belief in the reliability of construction in imagination and a derivative belief, according to an articulation which remains to be questioned, of the belief which is part of the intentional meaning of being first brought to the register of imagination. For it is she who makes the possibility as possibility that is. Given its mode of constitution, it is not more individual, nor more situated in time than the pure possibility. And this possibility, which is nothing other than the eidetic possibility, which, as we see, proceeds itself from one Stiftung (foundation)” (PE, pp. 163).

There is no absolute certainty in Richir’s words, there is a mere possibility of a construction in phantasy and imagination, undoubtedly, without Phantasia there would be no possibility of construction, as they all come from one, the process is not simple, nor absolute, Husserl’s words must be taken into consideration as they bring some light into this complicated issue: “external perception is a constant pretension to accomplish something that, by its very nature, it is not in a position to accomplish. Thus, it harbors an essential contradiction, as it were. My meaning will soon become clear to you once you intuitively grasp how the objective sense exhibits itself as unity <in> the unending manifolds of possible appearances; and seen upon closer
inspection, how the continual synthesis, as a unity of coinciding, allows the same sense to appear, and how a consciousness of ever new possibilities of appearance constantly persists over against the factual, limited courses of appearance, transcending them” (Husserl, 2012, pp. 39). This quote is key in understanding how the whole process works, firstly, Husserl makes clear that the external perception is more of a longing, an aim, rather than an attainable reality, then, there are a series of appearances presented to myself, which complicates even more such elaboration of insights, because they are not a complete display of itself, but as it propitiates a concurring series of events, they lead us to believe there is in fact a constant, a continuity and that we can actually have an external perception. We have set our parameters and standards under a fallacy and now is when we must reconsider our framework, retracing our structures and groundwork.

Indeed, the difficulty lies in believing that an external perception could be completely achieved, instead, there are limited courses of appearance, that we synthesize creating a final product that satisfies our needs. On the contrary, there is a disconnection, we must blend the stimuli we receive, as we do when watching a 3D movie, if we remove the special glasses, we can see a series of incomprehensible overlapping images that create a blurry image, however, without those glasses, we cannot identify as such image, we can only see a series of strange figures in front of us that are confusing and that become an intricate interwoven amalgam hard to comprehend by us, yet when we interpret the same compound with the help of the 3D glasses, we can recognize familiar images that are similar to our reality and everyday life. Thus, probably, we should also apply this approach when analyzing the relationship among Phantasia, self and other, in addition to the liaison with Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, as they will never be grasp completely, they will be merely interpret, yet we should complete this analysis to have a better understanding of what they really are.

Moreover, the key words in Husserl’s explanation are a unity of coinciding, we perceive this coherence and we tend to believe there is a continuity, rather than a sort of comportments that concur, and as a result they are providing us with the illusion of being a homogeneous whole that we can grasp and predict future movements and behaviors. In the same way, per Husserl’s indication we must refrain ourselves from
making absolute statements and we should embrace the uncertainty, shifting into the ambiguity within our object of study, unless we adopt this way of thinking, we will never be successful in our task. We cannot position ourselves in a neutral point to be able to grasp and analyze what is it or not, we must understand we are restrained by different factors, one of them is that there is a fragmentary semblance of the external perception, so to say, any conception of others is bounded by the way they appear themselves to us, another would be our own body, source of the beginning of the awareness, yet our own limitation to achieve it completely.

Then, we must realize that having a fixed conception is a construction made by us, rather than a set truth, we have to move on from such approach and start out considering that it is not happening as we expect it to, but as it is, so to say, our way of thinking leads us to understand the perceptions we have in a way such that we combine and incorporate an additional step, a missing one, to complete and to better grasp what we distinguish, in other terms, we tend to generalize from a couple of elements perceived, using the inductive method, rather than the deductive one. Furthermore, we also tend to overlook the fact that it is a never ending process, a becoming, yet never a completed action, never set, always changing, however, this key point makes our investigation complicated, mainly because it shifts our framework, changing our set parameters of understanding. It is what Richir emphasizes, when he recalls Husserl’s words it is the “variability” of phantasia and imagination, their most important feature is that they are both always changing, then when we believe we have a certainty, phantasia and imagination evolve into something new and different, making our intellect question itself, as it tends to complete whenever there is a disconnection, a blank, it is used to understand by homogeneous compound, even though such blended whole is full of holes and incomplete. We are inclined to fulfill from some given elements, it is helpful to predict and to recognize in the future similar situations, however, we must remove ourselves from such fallacy, but the difficulty resides not only in the incompleteness, but also in the mutability of both phantasia and imagination, whenever we believe we found a certitude, as it is always changing, we found ourselves in despair, our foundations tremble, and we should change our parameters, but whenever we set new ones, there is another modification.
Therefore, as mentioned previously, we cannot accept any longer that we can locate ourselves in a neutral point where we can comprehend completely and properly the whole process without interference. Then, another issue occurs, the foundation of our comprehension is also jeopardized, as my reasoning may differ from other’s, then, it seems to lead to a no common ground field, where each one of us will grasp differently. Although, this is not either Husserl, nor Richir’s standpoint, on the contrary, there is a mutual understanding, a shared point among each one of us, no isolation is allowed in their thought. There are some universal features that we all share that allow us to think and analyze the same way, however, it could be also due to the nature of the object of study, so to say, some of the perceived must correspond to what in reality is. Therefore, our senses do not drive us to external perception completely, but they are not absolutely mislead, some of the notions we have should correlate to the actual objects.

Nevertheless, intersubjectivity is not a simple notion in Richir’s view, as each self is unique, but they are connected to others becoming a community, a complex term and idea that makes sense when we withdraw ourselves from the limitations of a fixed and established system where we consider a static system with determined points in which we analyze everything, rather than a ever lasting change, and believing we can isolate ourselves to have a neutral, autonomous and independent point of view, the course of events is far from that steadiness.

Then, the main task would be discerning the uniqueness of the self and what makes it different form the others, this way of thinking is not bizarre, because if all the selves come from the Phantasie, they should be the same, that would be the most reasonable conclusion, however, as mentioned previously, that is not the real case. Therefore, two ideas would be fundamental to understanding such intricate relationship, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib. Mainly, because they represent the liaison between Phantasie and the self, the former, and with the body the latter, as Husserl pointed out self and body are inseparable, the author stress that he would be different if he had a different body, then, we can imply our body also determines who we are, our own self. Thus, our bodies, each one of them different from each other, but with similarities, may be the key to understanding the contrast self-other, yet the boundaries are undefined, as we cannot conclude this body-self is
determining in differentiating each one of us. Correspondingly, there will be no need of Phantasieleib nor Phantasie-Ich, but also, because this will be a simplistic explanation.

Thus, the need to find out a definition of intersubjectivity is essential to continue researching on Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib’s roles. According to Schnell, “actually, this is neither a systematic structure that grounds consciousness, nor a “collective consciousness” (or a “superego”). Moreover, it does not characterize a “social” (mundane) relationship that would be noticed from the outside. Transcendental intersubjectivity –and this is a completely original and new perspective– is a relationship between Me and the other that can be analyzed only within this relationship, starting from the ego.” (Schnell, 2010, pp. 10). Again, there is no external observer to identify what intersubjectivity is, but one must be part of it to realize it holistically. However, the fact of being part of such relationship, makes our analysis biased and it limit us from having a neutral perspective, furthermore, the object of study also changes and it is never fixed. Although, as Schnell states, we must begin from the self to grasp what this kinship with intersubjectivity is, despite we are already part of it and we cannot change that condition, therefore, the approach has changed from well-determined terms into changing and always developing ones. Again, to have a better understanding of intersubjectivity we must change our parameters, but also the way we undertake the task to achieve our goal.

Thereby, the rapport between self and other is, in fact, transcendental intersubjectivity, now what makes self and other different from each other, yet similar is fundamental to proceed. Here is where Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich’s function is key, therefore, a further analysis on both elements is necessary. Nevertheless, this idea of intersubjectivity as a relationship is really interesting, as it can be created, is not fixed, nor constant and it is modified and modifying at the same time, moreover, an ever evolving and lasting process that propititates the intricacy of an interwoven fabric, a tissue, in Richir’s words that conforms the community we live in. There is no isolation and everyone is interconnected, whereas, self seems to be in a solipsist situation, as Descartes 'though seem to lead us to believe, is never the case, as it is always interacting with others, and others with me, this connection makes our own self, different, and it changes others too, not to forget
that our bodies are also modified over time. Therefore, intersubjectivity is an active association, never static, a linkage that becomes an unbreakable bond among ourselves, that allows us too to be distinguishable from each other.

Moreover, Richir points out that we perceive *the other’s experience as present but not present* (PE, pp. 145). Undoubtedly, there is an insuperable disconnection between self and other, yet linked among each other. We feel connected and the similarities among us, although, we also perceive the differences and we can distinguish clearly the boundaries between our own self and others. Despite this separation, we must recall what Husserl stated about external perception, moreover, he also indicates that:

"The simple subject of phantasia, I cannot designate it as the same, nor as different with regard to my actual effective self. Just as also for a thing of phantasia, for example a table of phantasia, I am not to say whether it is the same nor another that this effectively real table: nota bene, if it is a phantasia, unrelated to actual reality. It is only if I make a position, whether it is a merely hypothetical position, a simple putting into play (Ansatz), that it is otherwise. [...] the possibility of subject of phantasie in so far as pure subject is an empty possibility, simple possibility of intuitive being [...] never a real possibility [...] Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are neither the same not any different from the actually real self or the actually real Leib. It is, underlined here, this characteristic of heterogeneity of the phantasia, of the Phantasiewelt, compared to the real world, which applies to the primary phantasia, the constitution of the image as fictum being put in parentheses"(PE, pp. 146).

This ambiguity of being not the same but neither different to what they refer to is really difficult to discern, as they have the same characteristics yet they diverge, probably due to the fact that there are *limited courses of appearances*, then, we can understand such dynamic, of being the same yet differ from itself. This lack of continuity is not a result of alterity, as it is pointed out that there is a *heterogeneity of phantasia*, our perception of such is what is changing, never its own nature. Yet, in order to have a better understanding of self and other, and how they contrast from each other, when they derive from the same phantasia, but also the same Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, we must conclude that the need of an additional element or elements is clear, then, to make self, self and other, the other, as both are clearly distinct from each other, but both are originated from the same initial point. Moreover, Phantasía’s role is fundamental in the whole process and determines the unity among self and other, but at the same time, we can tell the difference.
Richir elaborates further as he states that: “we have to interpret the primary process differently. In this manner, it even gives a certain type of necessity to the sequences, which never appear better than in our dreams, those are the apperceptions of phantasia. Phantasia has, once again, nothing of the "madness of the house" or of the "fantasy" playing "arbitrary" games — this is the place that has been assigned to it since the institution of Reason, that is to say, of philosophy.” (PE, pp. 312). Our parameters should change, as there is no randomness within Phantasia, in order to understanding it, we should change our way to approach it, as Richir emphasizes there are sequences, not a continuity of the same state, then, our task as philosophers is to focus otherwise and grasp it differently, if phantasia does not fit our framework, we should change it because Phantasia is not constant and will not modify itself to satisfy our requirements. This is the main difficulty as we usually need anchor points to justify our framework and to set up standing points to start out building our discourse. But this particular condition for our investigation is denied, first by Husserl and by Richir afterwards, as there is an ongoing development, an ever evolving process, where Phantasie remains itself, however, it is at the same time, new, changing itself, emerging, representing a difficulty to set any parameters to start out discerning what actually is.

However, there are some other elements in play that we must also acknowledge. Foremost, Richir’s words on Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib should be taken into consideration, as he analyzes Husserl’s ideas and synthesizes the information provided to understanding not only the notion of both elements, but also, what is necessary for them to become fixed elements, so to say, they are not being a mere image anymore. Despite of the apparent difficulty, we can summarize Phantasieleib as “a certain living body that is constituted itself within the free play of phantasial” (Sawada, 2015, pp. 172, my translation) Moreover, Richir defines Phantasie-Ich as the self of the imagination (2013). Both elements, as we have seen, have a close relationship with the Phantasie, however, both differ from each other, clearly. Furthermore, the way both elements become different from the Phantasie evolving into a unique and clearly different element is a complex process. Richir leads us into this intricate situation:
“In other words: the discovery of the reduction revealed, by Phantasia-Ich’s involvement in the scene, that the "perception" of the latter can only be a quasi-perception, modified by the "as if" imagines the whole, that "phantasmer" does not have the same status as perceived, for it is the "phantasmer" of phantasia, or, not in terms, the perception of phantasy, that because the "as if" (It is not an "act" like the others). It is noteworthy, for it is remarkable, that here we are also dealing with the discovery of an intentional implication (by "embodiment") and by no means a representation, or even a presentiment in image of the "lived" of phantasy [...] Let us stop at this first version that Husserl will resume. What he begins to explain is that the gaze of the phantasia itself has a look of phantasia, that is to say, a look on a fictum: it does nor should not take that look like a “look for laughter”, a "pseudo-gaze" or a fiction (invented) look: lost in my dream, I look, but I lost myself, the fight of centaurs. It is in this sense that the gaze, which supposes the eyes, is itself taken from the fiction of the fictum. But behind this prescription in terms of an intentional relationship, what concerns is the Phantasie-Ich or rather the Phantasieleib: this is the riddle, for every day, to which one must resolve. And what the reflection discovers is the implication of this clearer look if the Fingieren approaches the imaging, but we know that it is at risk that the sharpness loses it. We were saying that Husserl seems to be overcoming here the phantasia’s transmutation in imagination: we understand that it is because, in the updating of intentional involvement or consideration, as in 1905, but much more radically, than the gaze of the phantasia (classically everything inside, we will have the opportunity to return)” (PE, pp. 125)

We can observe, that at the beginning of the quote, the phrase “as if” is repeated a couple of times, Richir emphasizes that we do not have a certainty, but ambiguity, we do not perceive clearly and completely any of these elements, yet is an indirect process of approaching it, not only that, as an ongoing process is never complete and the moment we believe we have grasped it, is the past, it has changed, is not the same it was, that is why we realize it “as if". Despite of bringing into light both elements, Richir is aware of the difficulties in distinguishing both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich as they come from and are in part Phantasy, but also because both elements are part of a process, a work in progress, never settled, never fixed, never determined, then, defining them in absolute and set terms would be an error that neither Richir, nor Husserl made, yet grasping the nature of them is essential to comprehend in a holistically way what intersubjectivity is and hence, also what Phantasie’s process is. Grasping this idea is a difficult task that should not be simplified, it must be kept in sight that it is an ever-evolving process, never settled.

Moreover, Richir states that, instead of being a fixed and determined course, there is a game in place, it is a process, never a static situation, as a result, there is even a blinking, clignement, a discontinuity, a faint light that shows us the completion and the discontinuity of the process, there is a disappearing situation within, but also, in the upcoming one. However, such blinking is nota signal of malfunctioning,
nor of an error, neither it is a signal of a reversing situation, it indicates that it is evolving, that the previous situation has changed, moreover, it is actually changing, but it is incomplete, an unfinished step, where the image begins to become something different, it is not an image anymore, but it is not a fixed element yet either, therefore, the blinking is showing an interruption on its own essence, the disappearance of the past situation to becoming into a new one.

Richir’s words help us to have a better understanding of this complex process and brings into light what we should take into consideration when we take on this investigation:

“Let us start out from the beginning. The issue is the existence of Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, existence which, according to Husserl, proceed to the Ansatz, the face-off of its existence, and which therefore would be attestable. No doubt, in fact, by the Selbsverlorenheit, which, in turn, without this setting game (Ansatz) of existence, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are not present, that is to say, precisely, to origin, not directly attestable - they are just involved, but precisely by the perception of phantasy which is not present box itself. For Husserl, the certificate can occur in two ways. We know already the most: it’s when I figure, that is to say, when I imagine (fingieren) (whether I was or that I’ll be there, or I could be there) in the Phantasiewelt; I think that precisely, it is put into play, now see myself (in an intentional present) to be “phantasizing”. But then we saw, Phantasie-Ich Phantasieleib and there are only a picture, and moreover, in a picture, more or less fixed, incorporated figment which is fictitious specular reflection of the real me, the Leibkörper real. The certificate shows that a coherent deformation, architectonic transposition of phantasieren in fingieren, the Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib images where what they are represented, and at the same time, what they are missed. Rather than themselves as such (but as such they are infigurables) is a fictional representation of the image and makes the rest blink or flicker the image itself they are the same but, insofar they intentionally show up as present but not actually present. Certainly, they continue to play or flash in the image, the phantasy that there are still (in blinking, clignoment) in the image and makes the rest blink or flicker the image itself, but in as they are represented there, they are missed there.” (PE, pp. 147)

The fixation is the result of a process, both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib suffer a transformation, none of them are images anymore, to become fixed ones, but in this process they manifest their change of status by blinking, showing a difference in their previous state, to show their new nature, within the movement, there is a disconnection between the image and their fixed-state-to-be. Although, the results vary, both elements are not the same, they differ, but they also have similarities, as they proceed from Phantasie. That is why Richir pays careful attention to this moment, when they are evolving to become what they should be, when their whole situation is new and requires attention to be recognized, an interrupted process that
shows the instability of both combinations with the Phantasie. Nonetheless, Richir’s statement about our role in such apprehension is fundamental, it’s when I figure, that is to say, when I imagine, our active role is essential, we are not mere spectators, but agents in grasping this ongoing process, I have to change the way I would usually approach it, to fabricate it in a different way, I imagine, the ambiguity provided by this action is key in shifting our framework to finally understand there is no set standards and we cannot depend on them. This entangled and intricate compound that the intersubjectivity forms is elusive due to its own nature, therefore, our method should be adjusted to the object of our study and if such is always changing, we should also figure out a way so we can research without absolute concepts.

Regarding the existence of both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, Richir indicates that despite of not being attestable, both elements proceed to the Ansatz (approach, beginning), yet they are not present, not directly attestable, they are just involved, but precisely by the perception of phantasy as apperception of a non-present object, and the apparition of phantasy, which itself is not present. (PE, pp. 147) This definition is closer to an illusion rather than to an absolute fact, or an immovable evidence, yet by its disappearance we realize they are present, as this absence only can point out to its existence, making us figuring out that what we perceived is real, the lack of ubiquity implies corporeality. Then, the only way to grasp this idea is by an indirect method, no neutral position is available nor allowed, even though they are not verifiable and yet non-existent, we are certain of their existence as they are previous to the approach, to the beginning.

But Richir goes beyond pointing out that even Phantasieais not present, but it appears. Therefore, it seems a characteristic from the Phantasia, any element proceeding from it nor in part made of it will have this peculiar feature of being present in absence, not completely appearing or if they do, showing us they disappear, but not completely, as we learn that they are still there, the limits again are not fixed nor clearly delimited, as if that they evanesce, the residual portion of themselves leads us to discerning another side of them, its deficit. This occur with the letters in this paper, the lack of black marks helps constructing the letters we read or we write, for instance, the character “o” would be different if it did not have a blank
portion within, it will become a mere period, a point, a dot, changing the meaning and the value of the symbol, similarly, the blank lines in between paragraphs build up the writing, reading this excerpt would be difficult without those empty spaces, that shape and conform the whole document, or even the little space between words, that lack of letters helps out to better reading and understanding the meaning of the statements included in any written communication. Then, phantasia combines both its presence and the lack of it, our perception is not mislead, by this complex situations, on the contrary, phantasia shows us a different side of itself, as different states of being. There is no clear dichotomy among presence and absence for the phantasia, both are part of it, the interesting fact that Richir points out is that phantasia can be present in absence, the question would be, could it be absent in presence?

The key should be found again in the author’s words, where Richir stresses out the fact that:

"Of the appearances of phantasia, which must be admitted under the penalty of a kind of absurd absolute phenomenological idealism, or the schematism itself would create its "contents" called to pass into apperceptions, is the architectonic equivalent of what Plato called "sensations" in the unstable becoming. «Concrete contents» which are, in fact, as unstable, fluctuating, appearing/vanishing by discontinuous and instantaneous flashes as what, apart from what we mean by "sensations" in the modern tradition (but also since Aristotle), Plato understood by all the paradoxical characteristics of what is caught in becoming or genesis. And its distant offspring are found in every intentional hyle of perception, whether perceptual, memory, or phantasia. They are related to the Leiblichkeit (corporeality) of the Leib (flesh), with its kinestheses as schematisms of phenomenology, but even in their most archaic depths, they do not merge with it (nor with them). Everything, then, is not flesh or Leiblichkeit differentiated as one sometimes hears it in the metaphysics too quickly drawn from the last work of Merleau-Ponty. This "other origin", however, is enigmatic, and one must be extremely circumspect if one understands that it comes from the "world" (for the Leib is a total part of it)” (PE, pp. 474)

Hence, Plato already pointed out this distinction, “sensations” in the unstable becoming, therefore, we cannot clearly perceive, we merely sense and, moreover, Richir adds this perception is erratic, thus, we are not able to grip any belief as they are mutable and changing, in Richirianne words, such are apparitions of phantasia, but with the difference that they present themselves in an inchoate mode, thus, we must pay attention to all the displays as we may get a better understanding of the nature of such apparitions. Then, again, an appeal to Richir’s words is necessary, “not,
therefore, the kinestheses into actual or potential phantasia. It is not, therefore, the kinestheses which would be real (actually) accomplished movements of the real Leib (actual), also putting in motion the Körper that there is in the actually real Leib, but kinestheses which, to be in phantasia, nevertheless are made, in a certain way; I see; I feel, etc.—what Husserl expresses by a quasi movement of the eye in the phantasia. In this one, then, everything happens as if the Leib was undocked from the Körper, as if Leibkörper. It is in this paradox that we must think that the implication of Phantasieleib (and Phantasie-Ich) also holds in phantasia” (PE, pp. 141). This puzzle, this tangled compound supports each other in different ways, although, both elements, so to say, Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich should be analyzed within but at the same time, clearly determined and independent from the rest of the members of the community. Even more, as part of such, each one of us have a task, it makes sense because it is interpreted, I see; I feel, the value of self becomes indispensable in this intricate context. But it is also very interesting this remark made by Richir, as if the Leib was undocked from the Körper, as if Leibkörper, however, analyzing this statement would take our research to a different path and will have to be postponed. The fluctuation of one facet to other is constant, the interdependency among each and all members is undisputed, yet the limits among each other is not so explicit, one disjointed from the other, becomes a third element, which name is the composition of both, as a middle point of both, but neither one nor the other. Delimiting them, then becomes an arduous task, but an interesting one also, it must be reminded that we all form part of such cluster.

Once both, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, are justified and argued to prove its existence, the obvious path to follow should be defining both elements and discerning what makes them different, although necessary, however, due to their nature this project becomes a difficult one. Thus, Richir taking on Husserl’s writings, determines that there is a self of phantasy (Phantasie-Ich) and an undetermined body of phantasy, (Phantasieleib), whereas, the phantasy transposed into imagination. In his imaginative perception that builds on its appearance, this is its house, the object of apperception, but as a non-present object (PE, pp. 115). Uncertainty is a recurrent topic, yet we are sure both elements do exist, due to a certitude of their entities, their essences. The crux of the matter would be the perception made by ourselves, we
sense the existence of the object to be, we are certain this will become what it has to be, although, perceive them as non-current, we are foreseeing their nature, not their ongoing situation. We must recall that even the apparition of phantasia is non-present itself. The complexity of this uncertainty does not makes us giving up on the task, as we are dealing also with the imagination, in conjunction with Phantasie, therefore, we should use our imagination as an ally, despite certitude seems not to be part of such system, we must recall that the assurance of an ever-evolving Phantasie, as well as its own existence.

Nonetheless, the Phantasie-Ich should be understood as an imagined and imaginary self [...] that has not been in phantasia (PE, pp. 128) which complicates even more the situation, if it has not been in phantasia, why has the word Phantasie preceding the term? What is the relationship among Phantasie-Ich and Phantasie, then? We are set into a range of uncertainty that provides us with sufficient factual elements to guide us throughout our research, granting us the needed groundwork to continue our undertaking. Though, we must stress the importance of being an imagined and imaginary self, there is both a passive and an active role within, in addition to being perceived, distinguished, the uninvolved side of it is also necessary, in addition to the need of a process, a construction to itself but with a part of reflection on the whole process, that is why it is imagined, it is already created. There are angles to be grasped, the operative one, creator of its own nature and the one sensed, which implies there should be an independent observer to analyze it, the implication of this particular issue is crucial in understanding the interwoven tissue of Richir’s intersubjectivity.

To what extend does this analysis of mine determines an adjustment or a different development in our object of investigation? Besides to the change nurtured by itself, which makes our research complicated, we must recall, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib there are only a picture, and moreover, are in a picture, more or less fixed, incorporated figment which is fictitious specular reflection of the real self, the real Leibkörper. The same instant they are perceived, they are secluded to a particular time, to a singular aspect of themselves, they are not consider holistically, but partially and biased by our own insight, yet we have the urge of attaining such moment to better understand its nature and their role in the whole system. Although, we should not
forget that despite to this achievement, we must consider that *rather than* *themselves as such* (but as such they are infigurables) is a fictional representation of the image and makes the rest blink or flicker the image itself they are the same but, insofar they intentionally show up as present but not actually present, the key in Richir’s words is present, then, time plays an important role here. We observe a moment, a particular situation in a given time, not the whole situation, not their whole nature, but a fictional representation of the image obtained in our examination of them. We identify the past of both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, what they were, not what they are, they seem to be present, but it is only their prior situation in a particular and determined time frame.

However, Richir is more specific about this topic, we must focus on this quote to clarify concepts:

“The issue is the existence of Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, existence which, according to Husserl, proceed to the Ansatz, the bringing into play of its existence, and which therefore would be attestable. No doubt, in fact, by the Selbstverlorenheit (Self-indulgence), that, as far as they are concerned, without this setting game (Ansatz) of existence, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are not present, that is to say precisely, originally, they are not directly attestable—they are just involved, but precisely by the perception of phantasy as apperception of a non-present object, and the apparition of phantasia, which itself is not present.” (PE, pp. 147)

This evasiveness, as we can observe, is constant, then, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are not present, and they are not directly attestable, thus, it is not only a matter of timing, but a specific feature inherent to both elements, in addition to the phantasia, we cannot verify it, irrefutably. As previously mentioned, *I imagine*, therefore, I suppose I am acquiring a complete version of both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, deceiving myself, and from there I pretend to construct a theoretical corpus on such basis. We should question how we can attest them, then, Richir appeals to Husserl’s analysis on this topic, the latter points out to two different ways of attestation, one of them occurs when I figure, so to say, when *I imagine* (*fingieren*) *that I am the one (that I was there, or that I will be there, or that I could be there) in the Phantasiewelt*, clearly it is a construct made by myself, but also, an incomplete one, a supposition rather than a factual one. Once again, external perception becomes the complicated issue that we pursue and that we create according to our abilities.

Moreover, Richir specifies that: “Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are only in image, and in addition, in an image more or less fixed, constituted in fictum which is
a fictive speculative reflection of the real self, with its real Leibkörper. The attestation shows only a coherent deformation, by architectonic transposition of phantasieren in fingieren, of Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib in images or they are intentionally present, but actually not present. Certainly, they continue to play or blink in the image, by the phantasia which is still (in flickering) in the picture, and which makes the image itself flicker or wobble, but in the measure in which they are represented, they are also missed. Rather than themselves as such (but as such, they are infigurables), it is a fictive figuration of the specular image of the real Leibkörper” (PE, pp. 147, emphasis added). We should, then, consider both as images, figures of themselves, without forgetting that it is, in fact, a fictive figuration, and that in the measure in which they are represented, they are also missed, we will never grasp them completely, we are simply outlining them, not obtaining a holistic view, because there is an omission within its form. Such ambiguity should and will not cease our efforts in obtaining a better understanding of such intricate elements, on the contrary, it motivates us to continue in our task. Then, it is not a matter of completing them with the absence of themselves, but an undefinable capability from our part to grasp them completely, we are merely representing them, we are producing a biased portrait from a complexity beyond our understanding.

Now the question would be, how does Phantasie connect with the Ich and with the leib, in a separate way to become two clearly differentiated elements? Also, why the Ich and the leib are not together already prior having a connection with the Phantasie? What is lost in the fixation process for both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib? These questions need a further analysis, but the answer might not be as simple as expected. However, Richir clarifies Husserl’s investigation on this matter:

“If the Umfingieren (imaginative transformation) of Phantasia-Ich (oblivious of self, in loss of self in phantasia itself) in reflective self still contains in itself phantasia, if it does not therefore change register as to modification, adding phantasia (of the imagination) to phantasia, so if in this I am merely a "phantasmer" (imagining) phantasia, again implicating Phantasie-Ich (which, incidentally, entails the risk of regression to the infinite which Husserl pursued in 1905), it is true to say that the actual reality of phantasia is not modified as to its meaning of modification (Husserl escapes from the first formulation of the theory in 1905 as regards meaning of the experience of phantasia: is it present for itself or not?), but it is false to say that there is no coherent deformation in the content of phantasia of the "effective original reality of phantasia": it is indeed another actual reality of phantasia, a fugitive moment fixed
in the intentional present, the instant of suspense or of the epoch immediately temporalizes the present in retentions, in a fictional or imaginary image of a fictitious or imitative self, which substitutes surreptitiously to the primary phantasy by what Husserl called, in 1905, "phenomenization" (PE, pp. 128)

Thus, there is an alteration in phantasia, whereas, it is indeed a fugitive moment fixed in the intentional present, the instant of suspense or of the epoch immediately temporalizes the present in retentions, in a fictional or imaginary image of a fictitious or imitative self, therefore, there are several circumstances that propitiate this creation of Phantasie-Ich, but the common ground that facilitates such devising is time, as we can observe a moment is fixed in the present, however, as Richir points out, it is fictitious, we should not consider it as a holistic representation, as only presents itself in a particular occasion, a facet of itself, non applicable to its past form, nor to the future, but not even to its own present, as at the same time, it becomes already a representation of its own past, but in retentions, an incomplete version of itself, then, in a fictional or imaginary image of a fictitious or imitative self, still there is room for improvement, the involvement of another element to convert such fictitious self into a genuine one. Thereby, Phantasie-Ich is present in absence, as it is only considered as a fixed moment, in addition to the fact that there is a modification, it is indeed another actual reality of phantasia. Phantasie-Ich becomes de-attached from phantasia, actually, it is the phantasia the one that develop itself into something else, so different from itself that evolves into a brand new element, the Phantasie-Ich, yet, it is not a legitimate self, allowing diversity between selves, but we must not forget the need of a body is fundamental for such differentiation also.

Nevertheless, it is a very interesting point made by Richir, the “self is ‘sensitive’ of itself in such contact that, somehow, is the most archaic architectonic figure of the ‘consciousness of self’ or the ‘life’ of self and if, in virtue of the de-attachment of what constitutes in origin and that it already begets the diastole of the systole –the relaxation [détente] of this one” (Richir, 2013, pp. 615). There is clearly a tension among consciousness of self that is resolved as diastole and systole, but what does it mean? Is it an expansion and a retraction of the same elements? Is it a movement of the same elements? Or is it the conflict among the elements in play? This analysis will take us away from our primary task and must be postponed at this moment, but it is a really interesting topic for further investigations.
Taking on what self means, Richir appeals to Husserl’s words to find out that the simple subject of Phantasie cannot be defined as the same nor the different concerning to my own real self, even more, as previously mentioned, the possibility of subject of phantasie while pure subject of phantasia is an empty possibility, simple possibility of intuition. This quote makes Richir to imply that the “Phantasie-Ich and the Phantasieleib are not the same, nor different to the effectively real me and to the effectively real Leib, [...] there is an heterogeneous character of phantasia, of the Phantasiewelt, compared with the real world, which is worth for the primary phantasia, the constitution of the image as a fiction in parenthesis” (PE, pp. 146). Richir stresses out that to shape up our own self, we must have the combination of both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, Phantasia, therefore, should be present in two different aspects of itself, however, we must not forget that it is a mere image, we do not and we cannot perceive the wholeness of Phantasia, nor of none of the elements required, so to say, Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib.

According to this really interesting findings made by Richir, the image becomes a fiction, thus, is not completely real, then, it is a myth, an imagination, a fantasy, a fiction in parenthesis, about to be a real, to become a reality, this changing process is not simple and makes both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich appear and disappear, as a signal of a dead-end situation, their images should become something more real, then, they blink, they show the discontinuity of stop being an appearance to become a reality. Nevertheless, Richir points out that both elements are not the same and yet, different to the real me, or the real Leib. Again, the words of Husserl resonate within Richir’s thought, there is no self without my body, the issue is trying to identify and to comprehend interwoven elements in isolation, but it is a requisite to understanding what are their roles are but also, their differences from Phantasia. Undoubtedly, its influence and its control over the shaping in each one of our selves is fundamental, but as we have observed, it is not a direct action, but it seems an indirect one, firstly Phantasia transforms itself into two different and clearly separated elements, yet none of them are far from it, there is an evolution. Again, everything is interconnected, although, clearly differentiated, the separation among all the elements in play is minimum, yet it marks the distance among each other. Furthermore, if that is the case, then what is the difference among Phantasie-Ich and
Phantasieleib, as both are no different from the real me, nor the real Leib, how can two elements can be the same but at the same time divergent from the origin? Probably, the essence of Phantasie takes different forms when in junction with different elements, the resulting combinations are complex and distinctively unique, however, they share the common element, the Phantasie.

Furthermore, our experience of others is key in understanding the value and role of Phantasieleib, as Richir states, *the possibility of Phantasieleib is an empty non-eidetic possibility, the transpossibility of the experience of other*, it becomes the way we can recognize others as different to us, yet similar as we can communicate and realize their feelings. In Richir’s words:

“Let us add that this attestation by the experience of others, Phantasieleibs existing paradoxically in the real world implies since it is not at my free disposal and that the possibility of Phantasieleib is only an empty, non-eidetic possibility, the *transpossibility* of the experience of the other, which is always more than a possible eidetic, and the *transpossibility of the Phantasieleib* and its apparitions (including the *apparitions* of the interior), but in phantasia, mostly fluctuating, fleeting, proteiform, intermittent and obscure, of the Leib of the other) to what is each case consciousness with its *Jemeiningkeit* (disunity). If I «live» in the inner body of others, it’s not whether I am or I have literally been able to put myself in their skin, but because I live by the transpassibility because I know that it is transpassible to its interiority, although it is for me unknown and unimaginable in its interiority that it is for an undetermined and unimaginable self and, because this interiority vacillating or flashing as *Nullpunkt* point of no point, however, because the untraceable corporeally self is only a partially spatial cell and a spatial expanding hollow «phantastic» space where «self» (primordial, as late terms of Husserl) is organized differently, is also spatialized from there and no longer only here, but, so to speak as the space itself, in this side—or the space behind my perspective views in the perceptions that I have things and the world, and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, of time: an irreducible phase shift occurs between the time of the presence (without this assignable) of self and the time of the presence of the other, a made phase-shift or gap which, as flat output gap of spaces, of interiorities of the Leiblichkeiten (Corporeality) in their respective Nullpunkt, all possibility of non-specular, active mimesis, and from within. It will be used to design consciousness in its primary structure as temporalization in assignable presence without this—if not by the reflection that convert or transpose the appearance” (PE, pp. 149)

Despite self tries to grasp the other, Richir points out that is not completely done, still it is completed somewhat thanks to the *transpossibility of the experience of the other* granted by the Phantasieleib, demonstrating the disunity within. If we appeal to Husserl’s words, then, it must be inquired the value of another element within this interwoven tissue. As Husserl does include a very interesting definition in regard to the relationship among self and other, thus: “The empathy as the perception of
foreign flesh and as an assumption I make of an alien’s conscience is a natural part of the play by a consciousness, and it signifies for it certain links of motivation, some of a similar way to those related to simple reifying [chosiques] perceptions, yet to those related in turn, very different, however, exactly, that consciousness, the alien consciousness, is assumed as being a stream of consciousness of analogue essence and analogue regulation to «my» stream.” (Husserl, 2001, pp. 22). A further analysis is required to identify the role of both Phantasieleib and empathy in this discovering of the other and the liaison among them, however, it will imply taking on an unfocused approach, however, as mentioned previously all elements in play are interconnected and tangled, yet this task should be postponed at this moment.

Phantasieleib and its appearances are blinking, fluctuating, always coming from the Phantasia’s interior, the implicit link to the Phantasie is obvious, yet it is about to become something different, the same occurs with the Phantasie-Ich, therefore, the question Richir inquires about the existence of Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib, which according to Husserl proceed from the Ansatz (PE, pp. 147). Then, Richir comes to the conclusion that both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are not present in the origin, the location of both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib is still undetermined, yet, they appear to become the key players of the whole process, although, as mentioned previously, their image blinks, they are not there anymore, the ability of transforming themselves is crucial to understanding holistically the development of both elements. Yet, this idea of being transposed into other’s body so we can understand them better is really interesting, this topic summarizes what this interwoven tissue means, primarily because there is an union in distance, but also since it means we might be able to related to what self has to do in order to understand the others around.

However, if they are not at a particular position in a determined moment, they should be in a different location at the same time, according to the Cartesian coordinates, however, this does not seem to be the case of neither Phantasieleib nor Phantasie-Ich, because they are not changing positions, they are evolving, transforming themselves. Nevertheless, the idea of blinking is key in understanding Richir’s thought, but as we can see, it has become a key point to grasp his intersubjectivity, because the changing Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are essential
to it, but also, because this is a particular and peculiar feature intrinsic to Phantasie, we must not forget that this ever-evolving process could be perceived as different status of itself. This quote from both Husserl and Richir brings light into this topic:

“If, for the self of phantasie, I make the setting into play, then if I imagine that its reality is actually attestable, I necessarily come to the conclusion that the world which belongs to the self of phantasy is my world, but in other orientation, in any case, than my ability to perceive. But how can the self which is "phantasmal" as a correlate of this world be able to testify? He can testify, 1) whether this "I" is the same Self as the one who brings into play, if I, the one who is himself perceiving himself, I imagine (mirdenke) that I am transposed, or if I imagine that I have lived (remembrance) or that I will live (waiting: in the form of a movement towards to) or else that I will be able to live that, a motivated possibility of the exchange of my place in the Space and the world space, etc. 2) In these cases, the self put into play is identically the same as the actual self. What possibility is there now? Well only the one of 'Einfühlung' (Empathy), of the 'analogizing position' (Hua XIII, 312-313)

In other words, in our present terms, the first case falls entirely within the subjective Stiftung (Foundation) of my self and my Leibkörper (Fleshbody), that is to say, of my life and my experiences, of my Jemeinigkeit (Disunity), which indeed implies, the identity of the self thus transposed, in fact, by the imagination (sichdenken), and of the self which makes the transposition, which is indeed imaginary as such and does not emerge properly from the Phantasia, but already of its institution, and of its architectonic transposition into (the act of) imagination. The second possibility takes on striking relief: the testimony of Self of phantasie, and therefore of the body, living of phantasia, takes place more properly in the intersubjective encounter, and this we are in the process of understanding, because the Leib of the phantasia is nothing but the Leib itself, disengaged from the Leibkörper. But insofar as, in the phenomenological blinking (clignoment) of the phenomena, the Leib and living blink, also a sort of insularization by the apperception of the Leibkörper, the Phantasieleib and it appears to be linked to Phantasie-Ich, and thus also appears in the encounter as nothing but the opening to the other side of the same, but this can only be confirmed as this opening if it responds to it in echo, to give it its "horizontal figure" (PE, pp. 277)

In summary, whereas Husserl proposes that if I imagine self of phantasia’s reality and therefore, it is attestable, then its world is my world, otherwise to my ability to perceive. But the question is to justify how the self, phantasmal in his own
words, can testify so, according to Husserl there are two ways, the very first one refers to a motivated possibility of the exchange of my place, so to say, I imagine that I am transposed, in this case is the same self that puts into play and the same one who is perceiving itself, again an active and passive role of the self. Richir points out that this view takes place in the subjective Stiftung of myself and my Leibkörper, then, it is a compound of my life and experiences about my Jemeinigkeit (Disunity), therefore, the identity of self is transposed, revealing that it does not emerge properly from Phantasia, the disconnection is obvious from others, but Richir also adds that there is some kind of glitch in this de-attachment from Phantasia, an incomplete and fragmentary process that leads into a series of difficulties to find the path back or at least to find the deficiencies and to find a proper solution. If at the beginning, we could infer that the phantasias’s world is also mine, approaching a situation not only of equality, but also, we come up with a common ground, to find out afterwards that it is incomplete and develops inadequately from Phantasia, yet with this apparent paradox, it could be concluded is that we can assure the existent connection, but such is incomplete. Again, there is a difference within the community we are part of, a union in distance, that is the reason any analogy should be done cautiously, searching for similarities, but definitely paying attention also to the differences.

The second way Husserl proposes is that the self who puts into play is the actual self, limiting the possibilities to the Einfühlung (Empathy) of the ’analogizing position’, so to say, we must rely on the affinity of a location where we can compare ourselves to others. By the explanation given, it seems to Richir this a more interesting option, as it propitiates the intersubjective encounter, it is the actual testimony of Self of phantasia, and therefore of the body, living of phantasia, as we can observe, Richir perceives a stronger connection with phantasia in this case, then, there should be less room for disunion, thus, there should be less predicaments to map the links we have with phantasia. However, Richir also stresses out that Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are, in fact, associated, we can infer it as a result of isolation by the apperception of Leibkörper, yet this de-attachment represents the basis of any testimony and clearly, there should be some type of separation as there is an obvious distinction among the elements in play from Phantasia. Yet, such encounter just leads us to the ’horizontal figure’, which shows us a different angle of the same, but as a mirror, as an echo, not
the original, but the reflection, its appearance. There is some kind of reminiscence to Plato, who guided us in his Republic through a similar issue, we can refer to the allegory of the cave, where humans perceive the shadows of the real objects and take them as the original ones, as they are used to see only the picture reflected on the wall, they trust their senses and do not even try to find another explanation. Richir wants to guide us through the process of searching the real objects, instead of the shadows of them, even though we are not able to leave the cave we are in, so to say, the limitations inherent to our own bodies and selves our position determines where we stand and our perspective in regard to the others. But we must free ourselves from those disadvantages, and search for the truth, regardless of the obstacles we may encounter.

Furthermore, Richir specifies that: “In the case where the attestation is done by the mediation of Leib from the perspective of others, and it is necessary to understand the expression «analogizing position» which, again, does not pass through an image, by the relation of equal to equal, and therefore even less by a specular image—the same way is done also to the Körperlichkeit (corporeality) of a statue” (PE, pp. 147). Then, this «analogizing position» is fundamental to comprehend the blinking of both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich, yet we must be reminded that we should not take it as a Nullpunkt, it is not indeed a neutral point where we can observe it holistically, but an evaluating position, we are trying to grasp both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich. In particular, due to Richir’s clarification to Husserl’s view, yet it seems to be unclear, as we are certain that both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are connected but we grasp this idea when there is an isolation thanks to the apperception of Leibkörper, finding the solution by elimination, then, it serves us as a guide to distinguish both elements, and we must compare to realize they are connected, that is why this ‘analogizing position’ is fundamental to understanding the rest of the elements included in the community.

In addition, Richir points out that in order to be compared, they should fulfill some necessary requirements, so to say, they are alike, equivalent to each other and this is the reason why they cannot permeate the image, again, we are reminded external perception is not attainable, in particular, related to this two elusive elements. Nonetheless, Richir indicates that nothing is fixed and stable, not even the
conscience, as there is an on-going process, we cannot deny, it makes our research even more difficult, not only for the complexity of the object of study, but because of its nature always changing and in movement, taking on this task is a must to have a better understanding of what surrounds us and the community we are part of.

Thus we must evaluate the rest of the elements in play, but even more, our own reflection is also key in grasping the whole process. Then, an in-depth investigation is required, thus, “the conscience of phantasia is a modified conscience.[...]The “phantasma” is conscious in so far as «being as if»”(PE, pp. 150) There is always an incomplete status even in the conscience of phantasia, we can only approach it with an indirect method, as it is always changing and changed. The concept of phantasma is also really interesting to explain the importance of both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich, then, to Richir is such that it is empty. Accordingly, “the phantasm in the perception (which, it seems, for Husserl, is, in this case, necessarily imaginative) enters in the (imaginary) image that seems to put the present in it, it is, that is to say in its intentional essence; the primary phantasm, originally not present, appears as given in the intentional act of imagination, but without it being present nor it has ever been for itself.” (PE, pp. 111). Elusiveness is a constant in our research and our framework must be adjusted to it, flexibility is fundamental, as Richir states, our perception is not being present nor it has ever been for itself, the always evolving process does not stop for us and every finding should not be taken as static, stationary nor fixed. Additionally, the value of imagination besides this active role of self, I imagine, is crucial in understanding this phantasm in perception, but also the way we perceive by itself.

Nevertheless, the intrinsic nature of both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich imply a very significant feature, whereas, they appear and disappear, they blink and the moment we believe we have obtained a solid understanding of each and both of them, it seems there is an alteration and we cannot any longer assure what we grasped previously. Although, this evolution of both elements deserve further scrutiny, we must reflect on this statement: “This means that any real adjustments involves the horizon of a possible trial and error in the phantasy (Phantasie). Adjustment in which, we try and shape to extend for the very first time the horizon of the kinesthetic habit. This new formation involves the field of Phantasieleib as
below the real Leib.” (Murakami, 2007, pp. 143). The position of at least one element has become clear according to Murakami, where there are strata in reference to the Leib, Phantasieleib as below the real Leib. This reasoning makes us conclude that there is some kind of hierarchy within Phantasie, although, reading Husserl’s writings, this seems not to be the case, there is a conflict among the elements in play and, as a result, there is a systole and diastole that propitiates the evolution and the change needed.

Nevertheless, both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are not Phantasie anymore, yet they are not situated too far away from it, it seems there is a stratification, however, what is the amount of strata and which is the factor to establish such division? On the contrary, it seems that Husserl and Richir’s framework move towards Hegel’s writings on Spirit, whereas, we must appeal to the latter’s own words: “government is the reality of Spirit that is reflected into itself, the simple self of the entire ethical substance. This simple power does indeed allow the Family to expand into its constituent members, and to give to each part an enduring being and a being-for-self of its own. Spirit has in this its reality or its objective existence, and the Family is the element of this reality. But Spirit is at the same time the power of the whole, which brings these parts together again into a negative unity, giving them the feeling of their lack of independence, and keeping them aware that they have their life only in the whole” (Hegel, 1988, pp. 272). As we can see it seems that Phantasie, with discrepancies, seems to better fit this model, rather than to a hierarchical system of organization, where elements are clearly divided and separated from the origin. Moreover, Phantasie also have the same features, so to say, the elements involved are part of an integral compound that share a common ground, Phantasie, yet they are separate and appear to be autonomous from each other, however, they need the support of the origin itself, of the Phantasie. It is also really interesting this notion of negative unity, giving them the feeling of their lack of independence where there is a contradiction between being self-sufficient yet, dependent, in addition, Phantasie also brings all the parts together, then, it shares similar characteristics with Hegel’s Spirit.

Furthermore, defending this hierarchy would imply an isolation and self-management in each element, but this seems not to be the case, as the Phantasie
involves and affects all the elements in play, crossing each element one by one. If there is a stratification, then, there should be some independence and segregation in each of the parts within the compound, as we have seen, such idea is not conceivable neither in Richir’s nor Husserl’s writings, there is an interwoven tissue. As we have previously stated, there is a series of appearances, then, we cannot imply there is only a hierarchy among the elements in play, rather, the situation is more complicated than a mere ranking or scale among elements involved with Phantasia. In addition, if there were some strata, then, there should be a clear gap and the interaction among seems to be less clear or at least, limited. On the contrary, Richir points out that: “the dis-embedding in question of Phantasieleib and the Phantasie-Ich is also relative to every point in space, and at any place (defined as “surroundings” of the point) defined in space. We know, as we have already commented (about Hua XIII, 299-301), that this leads to the land of indeterminacy of Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich” (PE, pp. 261). Then, the distinction is not quite clear, whereas, the Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are not easily located, then, we cannot assume or infer they will be grouped in a different stratus, with clear limits, separated from each other, we must remember that ambiguity is a constant both in Husserl and in Richir’s though, in addition to the influence exercised by Phantasia in each and all the elements in play does not seem to allow such withdraw of the elements from this tissue. Additionally, if it is an ever-evolving situation, then, we must shift our vision, as strata seem to be a more fixed structure and it seems not to be the most appropriate for the continuous process involved within Phantasia and the interconnection among all the elements in play.

Thus, the indetermination is the common ground for both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich, moreover, when they are no longer an image, yet they are not fixed, when they are blinking they are showing their own nature, undetermined, infigurables, but not only in space, in state also. This intricate elements that tend to disappear, but appearing at the same time, are difficult to grasp, yet essential to the development of self and consequently, to intersubjectivity. Richir explains that: “it is, therefore, not even sure that the Phantasie-Ich and the Phantasieleib are discovered by reduction, as involved in the spatiality of the scene, are not updated, in the reflection, as already adapted to the appearance image that covers the occurrence of phantasy. But we
shall see later that the Phantasieleib has this exceptional property of being indeterminate (Hua, XIII, text n.10). By this, we say that insofar is the reflection as ori enteering center [...] we think that in reality it determines, at least in part, so that in effect it transmutes and transposes in order to adapt it to the image of the fictional object which is correspondingly transposed into the phantasie.” (PE, pp. 124). The relationship with Phantasia is obviously complicated, both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib are always grasped in a past situation, they change, they evolve, the factor of being involved in the spatiality of the scene is fundamental to understanding this really intricate notion, when we observe them, they are located in a particular space and time and when we try to figure them out, they have evolved and they might not be located in the same position, making them not easily locatable. Thus, Richir stresses out that Phantasieleib despite of being related to the body and being constrained to a particular space, has this exceptional property of being indeterminate, then, even though it is associated to this particular spot, we cannot assure it completely, it might have changed, this appearance is transmuted and transposed into phantasie. Again, we can testify Phantasie’s regulatory character, controlling, demanding from all the elements to be part of itself, even though they have some kind of self-regulation and independence, they rely always on Phantasia.

Therefore, both elements are involved in the spatiality of the scene, because Phantasie-Ich is related to self, and as it was stated previously, self is related with body, they are indivisible, further, both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich are not mere passive agents, they also create, in particular Phantasieleib as it is the orienteering center, because Phantasie associated with the Leib becomes the space that provides a direction to the image of the fictional object into phantasie. At the start, it seemed that both Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich tended to exit the Phantasie to remain in a different stratus, or at least in a different position, now this situation is not clear at all, as they come back to the Phantasie, guiding the images of the fictional objects into it. This task has become a double-way path, yet they both remain undetermined, they both blink and they are actively involved in conforming the self, with strong links to Phantasie. In addition, Richir seems to point out that we cannot grasp them by reduction, limiting them, decreasing them and constraining them might not be the best strategy, but it might be necessary to accomplish our task. Nevertheless, we are
circumscribed to our own boundaries, not to forget the impossibility of external perception.

Furthermore, the relationship among self and Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich is really fundamental and interesting, as well, then, we must recur to Richir’s words: “through the perception presented, a fictional point of view of I imaging the image of the imagination of a fantasy even precisely that in phantasia, there was of this view as floating, indeterminate, infigurables (as we shall see) as the same floating Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib” (PE, pp.116). This intricate interwoven intersubjectivity consequently has a way to keep all the elements in play together, however, they are connected in distance, therefore, all the relationships and links among each other should share the same characteristics, joined in a particular association, such that they are interdependent, but in a de-attachment, it also reminds to the relationship of Hegelian Spirit with the rest of the elements, but with the specification made by Richir that it is in fact an interwoven tissue. Therefore, there will never be a complete understanding of each other, as Richir stresses out, there is an I imaging, but the outcome is floating, indeterminate, infigurable(s), we are in an ambiguous environment, yet with further investigation we would be able to identify them better and predict the coincidences among them.

As we can observe, such combination is never determined, always infigurable and evolving, because it happens in phantasia, where the point of view is decisive, not to forget that there is no neutral one, the space plays an important role, either because we can identify the position or not, although that seems to apply not only to Phantasieleib and Phantasie-Ich, but also to the self, who takes different points of view to imagine the image, in phantasia. According to this explanation, Phantasia is portrayed as the means which propitiates the process itself, but also serves as support for all the components and factors involved. Therefore, phantasia leads, affecting all the elements in play, providing them with their most characteristic feature, indetermination. As we can see even the self is affected, as we have mentioned previously, thus, intersubjectivity is an interwoven tissue shaped with all the selves, then, as all selves are undetermined too, the movement is assured by all the members of the community, it is not a static situation, there is a tension as timing should also play a key role.
Nevertheless, we should reiterate that isolation is not an option in Richir’s intersubjectivity and as each self is in a different stage of that movement, provides with different timing and step in the process, which makes its analysis complicated, yet never impossible. This is what Richir proposes, a new re-foundation of phenomenology, we must think differently to approach the task of understanding the whole process in a holistic way.

Thus, Phantasie-Ich, the other element in play, shares with Phantasieleib some similarities, however, the differences are more interesting, because it confers the self with a peculiarity that the combination of Leib with Phantasie cannot transfer. Phantasie-Ich, it is necessary to conform the self, yet once it is combined with Phantasieleib, they both are indivisible, from that point on, they cannot separate from each other. Therefore, we can only perceive it through imagination, never present for itself, the volatility of each element makes our research an intricate task, and they all seem to need each other to be completely grasped. Despite of being able to grasp that the Phantasie serves as core, support for the rest of the elements in play, an inquire about the two other elements that create the combination is crucial in understanding both elements, what ever happened to the Ich and to the Leib, what is their position regarding the Phantasie? Do they stand in contraposition to the Phantasie? Or on the contrary, are they part of the Phantasie itself? It is a very complicated standpoint yet a very interesting one, as if the last case seems to be the most appropriate, discerning this intricate topic should remain at this point for a further analysis.

Although, our original task was to focus and to discern both Phantasie-Ich and Phantasieleib within intersubjectivity, after studying the implications not only of both elements, but also, finding out the influences and parts that affect them, achieving this goal of defining and constraining clearly both elements so we can have a better understanding seems to be incomplete at this point. In fact, such task is inconclusive, as the nature of both elements is ever-evolving, always changing, as repeatedly stressed out previously, therefore, an intermission is required to compile more information and knowledge to have a better understanding of our object of study, additionally, all elements are interconnected and they affect each other, to the point of achieving undefined boundaries, complicating our goal.
Then, we must return to the sources, so to say, Husserl’s and Richir’s writings to attempt to decode and figure out what the elements in play are like and the existent kinship among them, not omitting that they all share some type of features which confers them with similarities, but also with differences. Therefore, we are impelled to repeat the same characteristics not only to describe them, but also to know how they differ from one element to another, but it is necessary to clearly define and identify each part in this intricate tissue, it is a must to compare and contrast them, despite in appearance it seems repetitive. Nevertheless, being interconnected means acquiring an in-depth knowledge of the compound, part by part and as a whole as well. Among other findings, we can conclude that the common point is Phantasia, a very sophisticated and complicated one, as we have seen. Thus, the essence of Phantasia prompts us to be flexible in order to be able to fully grasp the community, otherwise we are determined to failure. As mentioned, the primary objective of determining clearly both of them is unfinished, it must be reminded that external perception also is an issue, in addition to the fact previously noted of the existent interconnection among all the elements within intersubjectivity. Despite of the added difficulty, a further research is required to have a better understanding, to circumscribe the parts of this tangled whole, it will guarantee us an advanced knowledge of not only the features of each compound, but also of the relationship among them, the unfinished task that lies before us and it is calling us to action.

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